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[I]t is equally true that within the class of targets there is considerable
randomness .... Thus, any American carrier and any other Pan Am flight
would have served the bombers' purposes as well as the ill-fated flight
103. At this point, we are confronted with the paradox and tragedy of in-
nocence.'
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INTRODUCTION
It has been almost ten years since Pan Am Flight 103 exploded
over Lockerbie, Scotland en route from Frankfurt to Detroit.2 Of the
270 people killed in the terrorist 3 attack, 189 were Americans.4
Among them were business people, airline employees, and college
students-including thirty-eight from Syracuse University returning
home from a semester of studying abroad.' In 1994, families of the
Lockerbie victims won a judgment6 against Pan Am for its role in
allowing a suitcase containing a bomb to be loaded on board the
plane.' The damages phase of this case created standards for damage
2. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306,
309, affid with modifying order 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1569 (1996) (describing the events leading up to the civil suit against Libya for
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3077 (1994). An "act of terrorism" is a violent act, dan-
gerous to human life, which is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
and is intended: "(1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (2) to influence
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (3) to affect the conduct
of a government by assassination or kidnapping." Id.
4. See In re Air Disaster, 37 F.3d 804, 810 (2d Cir. 1994) (characterizing the
passengers aboard Pan Am 103 and specifically detailing the American citizens).
5. See id, (describing the American passengers killed in the bombing); see
also Toni Locy, Families Suing Libya Over Pan Am Blast, WASH. POST, May 7,
1996, at A 13 (describing the victims of the bombing). See generally Peter Marks,
Remembering Pan Am 103: OffLong Island, Echoes From Lockerbie, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1996, § 4 (Magazine), at 1 (comparing the Pan Am 103 aftermath to TWA
Flight 800).
6. See In re Air Disaster, 37 F.3d at 830 (affirming jury verdicts in three cases
regarding liability and vacating awards for loss of society damages and loss of pa-
rental care damages). See generally John H. Cushman, Jr., Civil Trial of Lockerbie
Bombing Case Under Way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992, at A5 (explaining the theo-
ries and strategies of both sides in the case).
7. See In re Air Disaster, 37 F.3d at 811 (describing plaintiff's theory that
Libyan agents concealed the bomb inside a radio-cassette player and packed it in a
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awards in future cases against Pan Am resulting from the bombing.'
Based on the In re Air Disaster9 decision, the lead attorney for all 225
plaintiffs approximated total damage awards at $500 million, making
it among the largest disaster liability awards in history.'0 In fact, a
subsequent civil suit against Pan Am yielded $19 million in damages
to a widow, one of the largest awards to an individual in the history
of commercial airline disasters."
Criminal cases are currently pending against the alleged Libyan
perpetrators, Abd-al Basit al-Magrahi and Lamin Fhima, in both the
United States and the United Kingdom. Maintaining that it condemns
all terrorist activities, Libya considers itself a prime victim of terror-
ism and firmly denies any connection with the Pan Am bombing. 2
Despite repeated demands by the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the United Nations, Libya steadfastly refuses to turn either of the
suspects over to authorities. 3 Using a variety of tactics in an attempt
to escape the current sanctions, 4 Libya continues to ignore the de-
bronze suitcase loaded onto an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, Germany from which
it was transferred to Flight 103).
8. See id at 810 (considering the effect of the damage award in the civil trial
on future cases against the carrier).
9. 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994).
10. See Ronald Sullivan, Court Upholds Pan Am 103 Awards, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1994, at D2 (reviewing the civil judgments against Pan Am for the airline's
role in the bombing).
11. See Peter Marks, Widow of a Pan Am Crash Victim is Awarded S19 Mil-
lion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1995, at B5 (commenting on the size and importance of
the fourth civil judgment against Pan Am).
12. See Letter Dated 14 May 1992 From the Permanent Representative of the
Libyan Arab Jamhiriva to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/23918, Annex at 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter Libyan Letter to
U.N. Secretary-General] (responding to Security Council statements calling for
Libyan cooperation in the Pan Am 103 investigation).
13. See id (noting that the two agents remained in Libya following the indict-
ments); see also UN. Security Council Resolution 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3033d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1731 (1992) (condemning the Pan Am 103
bombing and urging the Libyan government to immediately cooperate in estab-
lishing responsibility for the incident); UN. Security Council Resolution 748, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1748 (1992) (reaffirming
Resolution 731 and describing sanctions to be imposed until the Security Council
decides that the Libyan government has complied with the requirements of Reso-
lution 731). The adoption of resolution 748 imposed sanctions on Libya restricting
international air travel, the provision of aircraft technology, and the provision of
arms or arms-related material. See id.
14. See supra note 13 (describing U.N. Security Council Resolution 748 im-
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mands of the international community.' 5
Recently, personal representatives of victims killed in the bomb-
ing 16 sued Libya 7 in New York district court, alleging that through
its agents,18 the Libyan government deliberately caused the bomb to
be placed on board Flight 103.19 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act2 ° (" FSIA") stymied the efforts of these plaintiffs by immunizing
posing international sanctions on Libya); infra notes 133-135 (discussing the im-
position of sanctions on Libya by the United States).
15. See Declaration on Libyan Terrorism, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Aug. 23, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File (observing impatiently that "en-
voys of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Tripoli repeatedly come
back empty-handed, without indications of compliance although with many assur-
ances of Libya's cooperation").
16. See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 309 (identifying the plaintiffs and their respec-
tive claims). Plaintiff Bruce Smith lost his wife on the flight and brought suit on
behalf of a class of family members of all passengers and crew killed in the
bombing. See id. Plaintiff Paul Hudson sued as personal representative for his wife
and daughter, both passengers on Flight 103. See id.
17. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is referred to throughout
this Note as Libya.
18. See Pan Am Flight 103 Indictments, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File (announcing the United States in-
dictments in the Lockerbie bombing). Both the United States and the United King-
dom indicted Abd-al Basit al-Magrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, and
Lamin Fhima, the former manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines office in Malta. See
id. The United States emphasized that "[t]his was a Libyan Government operation
from start to finish". Id.; see also Additional Information on the Bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, Dstate File (detailing specific information about all aspects of the plan-
ning and execution of the bombing). But see Stephen Breen, Foreign Office Acts
After New Lockerbie Claim, SCOTSMAN, July 9, 1997, at 8 (disclosing new infor-
mation regarding the testimony of a former high-ranking Iranian intelligence offi-
cer who claims Iran, not Libya, organized and perpetrated the bombing of Flight
103); Defector Says Iran is Behind Lockerbie Blast, HOUS. CHRON., July 7, 1997,
at 12 (considering new information that Iran is responsible for placing the bomb
aboard Flight 103).
Recently, Libya sent a letter directly to the families of the victims charging that
the "government of the United States is neither interested in the incident nor does
it care about the victims." See Thomas W. Lippman, Pan Am 103 Families Sent
Letter by Libya Declaring Interest in "Negotiations", WASH. POST, June 7, 1997,
at A19. For a debate by two family members of Flight 103 victims on the merit of
the Libyan-proposed negotiations, see Libya and Pan Am 103, WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 1997, at C3.
19. See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 309 (detailing plaintiffs' claims).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1994). For a general discussion of the purpose and
evolution of the FSIA, see William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 257 (1997).
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Libya against the jurisdiction of American courts.2 In response to
these difficulties, the recently enacted Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 199622 ("AEDPA") adds a new subsection to
the FSIA23 that removes the sovereign immunity of a foreign state
sponsoring terrorist activities.24
This Note examines the FSIA, both before and after its recent
amendment, in light of the Second Circuit holding in Smith v. So-
cialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.25 Part I explains sovereign
immunity, the FSIA, and the principle ofjus cogens." Part II dis-
cusses the facts of Smith and describes the court's analysis in holding
that Libya's violation ofjus cogens did not implicitly waive its sov-
ereign immunity. Part III considers the text of the antiterrorism ex-
ception and the limitations therein for plaintiffs bringing suits against
foreign sovereigns for terrorist activities. Part IV analyzes the four
primary concerns of the executive branch in granting civil jurisdic-
tion over cases of this type and concludes that these concerns are in-
sufficient to prevent prosecution of Libya in this case. Part V rec-
ommends federal cooperation with the Smith plaintiffs on remand,
consistent with both congressional intent under the FSIA and with
past United States actions in the fight against state-sponsored terror-
ism.
21. See Locy, supra note 5, at A13 (stating that in the past the FSIA doomed
civil lawsuits against foreign sovereigns sponsoring terrorism).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA].
23. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (1994).
24. See id (creating an antiterrorism exception to sovereign immunity under
the FSIA); see also Locy, supra note 5, at A13 (describing the effect of the
antiterrorism exception).
25. 121 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1996).
26. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (defining sovereign immunity
as a jurisdictional doctrine protecting foreign states from prosecution in the do-
mestic courts of another state).
27. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussingjus cogens). Ajus
cogens norm is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation
is permitted. See id
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I. BACKGROUND
A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Expressed by the maxim par in parem non habetjurisdictionem,28
the international community widely accepts the notion that a foreign
state enjoys some jurisdictional immunity in the domestic courts of
another state.29 Because this doctrine is jurisdictional rather than sub-
stantive," the immunity granted foreign states is therefore not abso-
lute.3' A state may choose not to plead sovereign immunity32 or may
explicitly waive its sovereign immunity, thereby submitting to the
jurisdiction of a foreign state.33 Further, a forum state34 has no obli-
gation to accept a plea of sovereign immunity before determining
that the foreign state acted as a sovereign."
28. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 316 (2d
ed. 1973) (defining the principles on which sovereign immunity rests). "[L]egal
persons of equal standing cannot have their disputes settled in the courts of one of
them." Id.
29. See Belsky et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception
to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Lmv, 77 CAL L.
REv. 365, 368-70 (1989) (providing information on the origins and evolution of
sovereign immunity).
30. See VEIJO HEISKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL TOPICS 133-34 (1992) (ex-
plaining the basic principles of sovereign immunity). A substantive law creates
rights or duties of parties rather than prescribing the method of enforcing those
rights as a jurisdictional law does. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed.
1990) (defining the term "substantive law").
31. See HEISKANEN, supra note 30, at 133-34 (setting forth the fundamental
tenets of sovereign immunity).
32. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6617 (commenting on implied waivers and providing examples). Choosing
not to plead sovereign immunity is one type of an implicit waiver of sovereign
immunity. Other implicit waivers recognized by Congress include cases where a
foreign state agrees to arbitration in another country and cases where a foreign
state agrees that the law of another country should govern a contract. See id.
33. See HEISKANEN, supra note 30, at 134 n.136 (explaining that a foreign state
may waive its immunity after the claim arises, or in advance). Explicit waivers oc-
cur when a foreign state renounces its immunity by treaty or in a contract with a
private party. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 18 (describing waivers
of immunity); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 327 (stating that an explicit
waiver may occur, inter alia, by treaty or other diplomatic communication, and by
domestic legislation establishing legal responsibility for an action).
34. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990). A forum is the "par-
ticular place where judicial or administrative remedy is pursued." Id.
35. See HEISKANEN, supra note 30, at 134-35 (explaining that the state is under
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A forum state may determine the sovereignty of another state
based on one of two doctrines. If the forum state follows the restric-
tive view of sovereign immunity, it grants immunity to foreign states
only for acts of a public law nature, or acts jure imperii, and not to
acts jure gestionis, or acts of a private law nature. 6 Conversely, if the
forum state adheres to the doctrine of absolute immunity it allows
immunity for all acts of foreign states regardless of their substantive
nature.
37
B. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
"Prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, United States law on
sovereign immunity bordered on the incoherent." 38 The United States
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 1952 in a
document known commonly as the "Tate Letter." 39 This shift from
absolute to restrictive immunity,4" brought United States law in line
with the law of many foreign states around the world.4 The adoption
of restrictive immunity, however, resulted in considerable confusion
no immediate obligation to grant a plea of sovereign immunity before it examines
the foreign state's actions in light of the forum state's laws).
36. See id at 134-35 (contrasting restrictive immunity from absolute immu-
nity). But cf BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 323-25 (discussing the debate over dis-
tinguishing jure imperii and jure gestionis and asserting that the classification of
acts as jure gestionis "requires value judgments which rest on political assump-
tions as to the proper sphere of state activity and of priorities in state policies").
37. See id (defining absolute immunity).
38. Belsky, supra note 29, at 368; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note
32, at 7 (stating that prior to the FSIA, United States law, unlike other legal sys-
tems, did not provide clear standards informing citizens when they have recourse
against a foreign state in a domestic court, or when a foreign state may assert sov-
ereign immunity).
39. See THEODORE R. GIUTTARi, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN
IMMINrnY 187 (1970). This letter, from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the
Secretary of State, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United
States, "has become in effect the basic point of departure for the judicial decisions
on sovereign immunity questions rendered in its aftermath." Id
40. See supra note 36 (differentiating between absolute and restrictive immu-
nity). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 8 (providing back-
ground on the historical development and interpretation of United States sovereign
immunity law and the shift from absolute to restrictive immunity). Disallowing
absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns in United States courts is consistent with
the established practice of the Justice Department to avoid pleading sovereign im-
munity in suits against the United States abroad. See id at 9.
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 7-8 (emphasizing that for-
eign courts apply restrictive immunity against the United States).
445
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among United States courts applying the sovereign immunity doe-
trine."
Congress enacted the FSIA in an attempt to provide clear stan-
dards for the application of the restrictive immunity doctrine. 3 A
principle objective of this legislation at the time of its enactment was
to ensure that determinations of sovereign immunity occurred in the
judicial branch rather than the executive branch.' This transfer freed
the State Department from case-by-case diplomatic pressures and en-
sured that legal grounds would provide the sole basis for sovereign
immunity decisions. 45 Thus, the FSIA codified the restrictive theory
of immunity, clarifying the applicable legal standards and establish-
ing uniform procedures for litigation against foreign states in Ameri-
can courts.46
The FSIA is the only means to gain jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in a United States court.47 The FSIA embraces the pre-
sumption that states generally are immune from suit and creates a
number of limited exceptions to this rule.4 ' Foreign states do not
benefit from immunity under the FSIA in cases concerning express
or implied waiver, commercial activities, rights to property taken in
42. See Belsky, supra note 29, at 369 (discussing the history of sovereign im-
munity law in the United States and the need for the FSIA).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that the FSIA will
ensure that all United States courts apply restrictive immunity and noting that in
the absence of the FSIA this was not always the case).
44. See id. at 8 (stating that "virtually every other country" makes sovereign
immunity decisions exclusively in the judiciary).
45. See id. (discussing the intent of Congress to prevent the State Department
from reacting to diplomatic pressure from a foreign state trying to assert sovereign
immunity).
46. See id at 7-8 (outlining the purposes of the FSIA).
47. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
439 (1989) (holding that the FSIA is the sole basis for acquiring jurisdiction over a
foreign state in a federal court), rev'g 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
the Alien Tort Claims Act provided a basis for jurisdiction over a foreign sover-
eign). The Alien Tort Claims Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 12 (declaring that the
FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions
of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in
the United States").
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(7) (1994) (setting out general exceptions to
the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state).
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violation of international law, personal injury or death claims, and
enforcement of arbitration agreements.4 9
There is not a categorical exception for torts violating international
law in the FSIA.0 Before the 1996 amendment, this presented a seri-
ous impediment to citizens attempting to hold a foreign state liable
for its actions." If the plaintiffs could not fit their claim within one of
the specified exceptions to immunity, the foreign state evaded all le-
gal responsibility for its actions.'
C. JUS COGENS
A relatively recent concept,53 ajus cogens norm is "a peremptory
norm54 of general international law."" These norms are recognized
by the international community as vital to its functioning, and are
therefore considered non-derogable standards.56 Jus cogens norms are
49. See id at § 1605(a)(1)-(6) (defining the first six exceptions to sovereign
immunity).
50. See Belsky, supra note 29, at 370 (describing the framework of the FSIA).
51. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (holding that the non-
commercial tort exception of the FSIA did not apply to actions of the Saudi Ara-
bian police); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing that because plaintiffs based their claim on the noncommercial tort exception,
they could not execute the judgment against Chile's commercial assets); see also
Senate Judiciary Committee News Conference, available in 1996 XWL 199479
(statement of Bruce Smith) (stating that the FSIA is protecting Libya rather than
assisting the American family members of Pan Am 103 victims); David Mack-
usick, Comment, Human Rights v. Sovereign Rights: The State Sponsored Terror-
ism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv.
741, 767 (1996) (commenting that the Smith plaintiffs were fortunate to have an
alternate forum in Scotland and noting that plaintiffs in other cases, without an al-
ternate forum, lost their claims).
52. See Belsky, supra note 29, at 370 (discussing the limitations of the FSIA
prior to the 1996 amendment and hypothesizing that these limitations spurred the
Second Circuit "to pursue a novel approach" in Amerada Hess).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 391, § 102 reporter's note 6 (1987) (discussing peremptory norms and
stating that the concept ofjus cogens is of recent origin).
54. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "peremp-
tory" as "imperative; final; decisive; absolute; conclusive; positive; not admitting
of question, delay, reconsideration or of any alternative"). A peremptory rule is
defined as "an absolute rule; a rule without any condition or alternative of show-
ing cause." Id at 1137.
55. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 698.
56. See id (defining a peremptory norm of general international law); see also
447
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universally binding by their nature and do not depend upon the con-
sent of individual states. Instead, a state, by its mere existence, im-
plies acceptance ofjus cogens.5 7
The termjus cogens describes peremptory norms "whose per-
ceived importance, based on certain values and interests, rises to a
level which is acknowledged to be superior to another principle,
norm, or rule and thus overrides it.""8 Acts of slavery, genocide, and
torture, among others, are considered to be violations ofjus cogens.5
9
Once established, only a subsequent norm of the same character may
modify ajus cogens standard.6"
Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citing The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); HEISKANEN, supra
note 30, at 393 (describing the prohibition of the use of force as a jus cogens
norm).
57. See Belsky, supra note 29, at 399 (contrastingjus cogens norms from cus-
tomary law norms on the basis that customary law relies on the consent of individ-
ual states whilejus cogens norms do not).
58 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 472 (1992); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 53, at § 102 cmt. k (explain-
ing the interaction between jus cogens norms and other international laws); see
also Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional
Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Pri-
macy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 438-441 (1988) (recognizing that when a
conflict exists between a federal statute and customary international law, especially
jus cogens, customary international law prevails).
59. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 840 (1997) (providing examples of actions commonly considered to violate
jus cogens). It is generally accepted that the United Nations Charter principles
prohibiting the use of force are considered to be jus cogens. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 53, at §
102 cmt. k (defining jus cogens). Some scholars support expanding the scope of
jus cogens to include such concepts as the right to life and the prohibition of apart-
heid. See generally Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6
CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) (remarking skeptically that an increasing number of
human rights are being labeled asjus cogens norms).
60. See id (stating how a jus cogens norm may be modified); see also
BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 499-500 (observing that the important distinguishing
feature ofjus cogens norms is their relative indelibility).
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II. SMITH V SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB
JAMAHIRIYA
A. BACKGROUND
In 1995, Bruce Smith and Paul Hudson, both of whom lost their
wives on Flight 103, brought suit against Libya and its agents in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,6'
alleging responsibility for the bombing. Granting Libya's motion to
dismiss,63 the district court held that the plaintiffs lacked jurisdiction
under the FSIA.6'
Plaintiffs subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit,6 advanc-
ing four reasons for asserting United States jurisdiction over Libya:
(1) implied waiver of immunity under the FSIA arising from Libya's
alleged participation in actions that violate jus cogens norms;6' (2)
implied waiver of immunity under the FSIA arising from Libya's al-
leged guaranty of any damage judgment against defendants al-
Megrahi and Fhima;67 (3) the occurrence of the bombing on "terri-
61. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306,
309, aff'd with modifying order 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1569 (1996).
62. See id (describing the background and posture of Smith). Mr. Smith al-
leged in his complaint that "[t]he actions of Libya in encouraging and sustaining
these private acts [of terrorism] led to the deliberate and willful destruction of [the
plane]." Id (citing Smith Complaint 11). Mr. Hudson maintained that "the al-
leged bomb 'was placed on board the aircraft and detonated by and at the direction
of Libya."' Id (citing Hudson Complaint 11).
63. See id (stating that the motion to dismiss was pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) for lack of subject matter jurisidiction and lack of personal
jurisdiction).
64. See id at 315 (explaining that the federal courts do not have the authority
to determine that a state impliedly waived its sovereign immunity only by showing
it acted in violation ofjus cogens).
65. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1996).
66. See id at 242-45 (discussing the implied waiver argument).
67. See id at 245-46 (reviewing the Libyan guaranty of damages). A February
27, 1992 letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, Secretary of the Libyan People's Com-
mittee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, to the Secretary General
of the United Nations contained the damages guaranty, stating: "Despite the fact
that discussion of the question of compensation is premature... Libya guarantees
the payment of any compensation that might be incurred by the responsibility of
the two suspects who are its nationals in the event that they were unable to pay."
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tory" of the United States;6" and (4) the argument that Libya's im-
munity conflicts with the United Nations Charter.69 The court con-
centrated its reasoning on the implied waiver argument, holding that
ajus cogens violation was not an implied waiver of sovereign immu-
nity within the meaning of the FSIA.7° Accordingly, the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.7
Although subsequent to the passage of the AEDPA, the court did
not consider the antiterrorism exception in its opinion.72 The Second
Circuit later modified its order in this case to permit remand to the
district court, so that the plaintiffs could amend their complaint."
Plaintiffs likely will amend their claims against Libya to take into
account the FSIA's new language.74
Id at 245. The court accepted Libya's narrow construction of implied waiver, and
concluded that even if the text of this letter gave rise to a binding guarantee, with-
out a waiver of immunity the United States lacked jurisdiction to enforce the obli-
gation. See id.
68. See id. at 246 (asserting that merely because a civil aircraft is subject to
United States authority does not necessarily mean it is included in the territory of
the United States); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994) (removing immunity
"in any case ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death ... occurring in the United States and caused by the tor-
tious act or omission of that foreign state").
69. See Smith, 101 F.3d at 246 (analyzing the possibility of conflict between
sovereign immunity and the United Nations Charter). Mr. Smith and Mr. Hudson
urged the court that Article 25 of the United Nations Charter obligates all member
nations to accept Security Council Resolutions, thereby committing Libya to pay
compensation to the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 as mandated in Resolution 748.
See id. The court concluded that "the FSIA's displacement of immunity, applica-
ble to international agreements in effect at the time the FSIA was adopted, does
not contemplate a dynamic expansion whereby FSIA immunity can be removed by
action of the UN taken after the FSIA was enacted." Smith, 101 F.3d at 246.
70. See Smith, 101 F.3d at 247 (holding that ajus cogens violation does not
implicitly waive sovereign immunity).
71. See id.
72. See id. (holding that the FSIA, "prior to the recent amendment," does not
allow the district court jurisdiction over Libya and stating "[w]hether the recent
amendment affords a remedy to some or all of the appellants remains to be deter-
mined in subsequent litigation").
73. See id. (modifying the judgment and remanding the case to the district
court).
74. See infra notes 103-104 (explaining that the antiterrorism exception in the
AEDPA was specifically formulated to assist the families of Pan Am 103 victims
in bringing civil suits against Libya).
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B. IMPLIED WAIVER FROM Jus COGENS VIOLATION
The court devoted most of its attention to the plaintiffs' argument
that Libya impliedly waived its sovereign immunity by acting in
violation ofjus cogens norms.75 Libya, arguing for a narrow con-
struction of implied waiver, agreed that its participation in the
bombing of a passenger aircraft would be a violation of jus cogens,
but disputed that ajus cogens violation constitutes an implied waiver
of sovereign immunity under the language and meaning of the
FSIA.76 After examining the terms of the FSIA and its legislative
history, the court agreed with Libya and rejected the broad construc-
tion of implied waiver urged by the plaintiffs."
1. The Congressional Intent of" Waiver by Implication"
Determining the congressional intent of the implied waiver provi-
sion of the FSIA was critical to the outcome in Smith.7" Proponents
of plaintiffs' argument contend that foreign states relinquish sover-
eign immunity upon engaging in conduct that violates fundamental
humanitarian standards. 9 Through such actions, a state effectively
withdraws from the community of nations and waives any immunity
rights that belong to members of the community. The Second Circuit
75. See Smith, 101 F.3d at 242-45 (stating that the issue before the court is
what Congress meant by the term implied waiver, not whether an implied waiver
based on ajus cogens violation is appropriate).
76. See id at 242 (relating the Libyan response to the implied waiver argu-
ment); see also supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text (discussing the history
and text of the FSIA).
77. See Smith, 101 F.3d at 244 (concluding that ajus cogens violation does not
comprise an implied waiver of sovereign immunity).
78. See id at 242 (stating that the issue before the court was "not whether an
implied waiver derived from a nation's existence is a good idea, but whether an
implied waiver of that sort is what Congress contemplated.")
79. See, e.g., Belsky, supra note 29, at 368-76 (arguing that courts should rec-
ognize implied waiver forjus cogens violations); Smith, 101 F.3d at 242 (recog-
nizing that "[t]he argument is premised on the idea that because observance ofjus
cogens is so universally recognized as vital to the functioning of a community of
nations, every nation impliedly waives its traditional sovereign immunity for vio-
lations of such fundamental standards by the very act of holding itself out as a
state"); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (asserting that Germany implicitly waived its sover-
eign immunity for its role in the atrocities of the Holocaust).
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acknowledged that this argument is appealing," but nonetheless ex-
amined the text and legislative history of the FSIA.8'
The FSIA simply states that a "foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the
States in any case... in which the foreign state has waived its im-
munity either explicitly or by implication."82 Although this language
does not clearly manifest congressional intent, the court advanced
three plausible meanings for implied waiver based on this text: (1)
"such a waiver can mean that an actor intended to waive a protec-
tion, even though [the actor] did not say so expressly;" 3 (2) "an im-
plied waiver might arise whenever an act has been taken under cir-
cumstances that would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that
the act generally manifests an intent to waive, whether or not the ac-
tor had such intent in the particular case;"" and (3) "that the law
deems an actor to have surrendered a protection, regardless of the
actor's subjective or objectively reasonable intent."85 Without ex-
pressly deciding which of these three possibilities Congress intended,
the Court found that Congress did not intend "implied waiver" to be
as broadly construed as the plaintiffs argued.86
The ambiguity of the statutory language is lessened by the com-
mittee report accompanying the FSIA, wherein Congress sets forth
three situations in which sovereign immunity is impliedly waived.
First, agreeing to foreign arbitration.87 Second, agreeing to apply for-
eign law to contract interpretation.8 Third, filing a responsive
pleading without asserting a sovereign immunity defense. 9 From this
legislative history, the court concluded that Congress "primarily ex-
80. SeeSmith, 101 F.3dat242.
81. See id. at 242-45 (analyzing the legislative history of the FSIA to determine
the congressional intent of implied waiver).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994).
83. Smith, 101 F.3dat243.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. See id. at 243-44; see also Louise Ellen Teitz, et al., International Legal
Developments in Review: 1996 Business Transactions and Disputes, 1997 INT'L
LAW. 317, 328.
87. See H.R REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 18 (describing circumstances
under which a foreign state impliedly waives its sovereign immunity).
88. See id
89. See id.; see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (distinguishing
between express and implied waivers).
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pected courts to hold a foreign state to an implied waiver of sover-
eign immunity by the state's actions in relation to the conduct of liti-
gation." o Thus, the court held that the implied waiver provisions of
the FSIA do not include waiver by the mere existence of the state in
the international community."
2. The Second Circuit's Application of Precedent
Although the court did not find a clear congressional intent in the
text or history of the bill, it did recognize that "[this court] and other
courts have observed that 'the implied waiver provision of Section
1605(a)(1) must be construed narrowly."'" In Shapiro v. Republic of
Bolivia,93 the Second Circuit held that the implied waiver doctrine
did not include counterclaims based on a suit filed by a foreign sov-
ereign in a United States court.9 The court states that the three types
of implied waivers in the House Report" "involve circumstances in
which the waiver was unmistakable." 96 The opinion notes that courts
are hesitant to find an implied waiver in circumstances where the in-
tent to waive sovereign immunity is equivocal. 9'
Similarly, in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,98 the District
of Columbia Circuit determined that the basis for implied waiver un-
der the FSIA is the foreign state's amenability to the suit in the
United States.99 The court refused to accept that Nazi atrocities dur-
90. See Smith, 101 F.3d at 243-44 (discussing congressional examples of im-
plied waivers and concluding that all three "share a close relationship to the litiga-
tion process").
91. See id at 244 (commenting that a sovereign state is expected to be amena-
ble to foreign suits against it forjus cogens violations).
92. See id at 243 (citing Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1017
(2d Cir. 1991)) "Federal courts have been virtually unanimous in holding that the
implied waiver provision of Section 1605(a)(1) must be construed narrowly." Id;
accord Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 444
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing that there is "substantial precedent construing the
implied waiver provision narrowly").
93. Shapiro, 930 F2d 1013, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991).
94. See id (holding that associated claims did not fall under the implied waiver
doctrine).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 18 (describing three situa-
tions in which courts have found implicit waivers of sovereign immunity).
96. 930 F.2d at 1017.
97. See id (noting that implied waivers must be unequivocal).
98. 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
99. See id The court based this holding on the three examples of implied
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ing World War II, inarguably in violation of even the most narrow
reading of jus cogens standards, gave rise to an implied waiver of
sovereign immunity.' °
While the Second Circuit took care to keep it's holding within the
bounds of applicable precedent, it did not consider the effects of the
AEDPA on the case. Congress designed a portion of this legislation,
the antiterrorism exception, to markedly impact the plaintiffs' case
against Libya.' This legislation, as discussed below, obviates the
necessity of the plaintiffs' implied waiver argument by creating an
explicit exception to sovereign immunity for state support of certain
terrorist activities.
III. THE ANTITERRORISM EXCEPTION
"In the aftermath of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
explosions, terrorism is at the center stage of American political dis-
course." 02 It was in the wake of these events that the Antiterrorism
Act originated. 103 Congress specifically formulated the antiterrorism
exception to the FSIA to provide a remedy to the families of the
Lockerbie victims.
104
A. TEXT OF THE EXCEPTION
Under the terms of the exception, sovereign immunity shall not be
available in "any case . . . in which money damages are sought
waivers provided by Congress in H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 18.
100. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 (holding that German actions in World War II
did not constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity).
101. See infra notes 103-104 (explaining that Congress designed the
antiterrorism exception for the families of Flight 103 victims).
102. ZULAIKA & DOUGLASS, supra note 1, at ix.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 37, 62 (1995) (providing legislative history
for the Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995 and noting that the origin of
antiterrorism legislation is tied to a series of terrorist events including the bombing
of Pan Am 103, the World Trade Center bombing, and the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing); see also Statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing S. 735, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 719 (April 24, 1996) (commenting that the AEDPA is
a tribute to the victims of terrorism).
104. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-48, at 2 (1997), available in 1997 WL 177368 (pg.
unavail. online) (explaining that the foreign sovereign immunity provisions of the
Antiterrorism Act respond to the "revelation that the Libyan government assisted
in blowing up Pan Am 103").
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against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by
an act of torture,"0 5 extrajudicial killing,0 6 aircraft sabotage,'0 7 hos-
tage taking,108 or the provision of material support or resources...
105. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1994).
The term "torture" is defined as:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control,
by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or in-
herent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or
a third person information or a confession, punishng that individual for an act that in-
dividual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimi-
dating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind.
Id
106. See id at § 3(a). "Extrajudicial killing" means:
[A] deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regu-
larly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such kill-
ing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a
foreign nation.
Id
107. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sep. 23, 1971, art. 1, 24 U.S.T. 564, 568. A person is guilty of
"aircraft sabotage" if he intentionally and unlawfully:
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act
is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damages to such an aircraft which renders
it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a
device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it
which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endan-
ger its safety in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if
any such act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft in flight; or
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the
saftey of an aircraft in flight
Id
108. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res.
34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34 h Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 113, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/341L.23 (1979). A "hostage taker" is:
1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the 'hostage') in order to compel a
third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural
or juridicial person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of
taking of hostages ('hostage-taking') within the meaning of this Convention.
2. Any person who:
(a) attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
455
AM. U INT'L L. REV.[
for such an act."' 09 The obvious effect is to eliminate the defense of
foreign sovereign immunity from certain claims for damages arising
from terrorist and terrorist sponsored activities.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXCEPTION
Presumably, this exception should begin a new era in civil litiga-
tion against foreign sovereigns supporting terrorist activities. Foreign
policy concerns in the executive branch, however, led to the inclu-
sion of language that significantly reduces the efficacy of the
antiterrorism exception."' 0
First, the new language of the FSIA provides that a court should
decline to hear the case if: (1) the foreign state, at the time the ter-
rorist act occurred, is not designated by the Export Administration
Act"' or the Foreign Assistance Act"2 as a terrorist sponsor;"' (2)
the above acts designate the foreign state as a state sponsor of terror-
(b) participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit an act
of hostage-taking likewise commits an offence for the purposes of this Convention.
Id.
109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7) (1994).
110. See Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 14
(1994) (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor to the United States
State Department) (discussing the concerns of the State Department regarding
antiterrorism amendments to the FSIA) [hereinafter Borek Statement].
"[P]roceedings could in some instances interfere with U.S. counter-terrorism ob-
jectives. They could also raise difficult issues involving sensitive intelligence and
national security information." 1d; see Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 9 (1994) (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General) (noting that expanding United States jurisdiction
would have foreign policy ramifications and deferring to the comments of the
State Department on the substance of the legislation) [hereinafter Schiffer State-
ment]; Monroe Leigh, 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
with Respect to Terrorist Activities, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 188 (1997) (observing
that the Justice Department "insisted on adding" language limiting discovery
against the United States).
111. 50 U.S.C. §24050) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-383, supra note
102, at 41-62 (describing the existence of state-sponsored terrorism and identify-
ing Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as terrorist sponsors).
112. 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1994) (denying assistance under multiple laws to any
country the Secretary of State determines is a recurrent supporter of international
terrorism).
113. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (1997) (noting that a state must be desig-
nated as a state sponsor of terrorism for the antiterrorism exception to apply).
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ism but there was no attempt by the claimant to pursue the claim
through arbitration;114 or (3) the claimant or victim was not a United
States citizen when the terrorist act occurred.' 5
Additionally, plaintiffs filing suit under the amended FSIA must
do so within ten years of accrual of the cause of action." 6 This statute
of limitations poses a significant problem that stems from the long
delays in identifying terrorist parties." 7 The clandestine nature of ter-
rorists potentially bars many civil suits.
Finally, the provision of the exception posing the greatest obstacle
for the Pan Am families, and similar plaintiffs, is the section detail-
ing "limitation[s] on discovery." "8 A court must stay any discovery
demand on the United States if the Attorney General "certifies [it]
would significantly interfere with a criminal investigation or prose-
cution, or a national security operation, related to the incident that
gave rise to the cause of action." '' The stay is to remain in effect"'
114. See id § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i) (explaining that the claimant must allow a rea-
sonable time for the foreign state to arbitrate the claim).
115. See id § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii) (requiring the claimant or victim to be a citizen
of the United States). This provision is the subject of H.R. 1225, which makes a
"technical correction" to the FSIA provisions of the AEDPA. See H.R. REP. No.
105-48 supra note 104, at 4. The original version of the exception required that
both the claimant and the victim be American nationals. See id H.R. 1225 brought
the language of the exception into conformity with the intent of the drafters, which
"was that a family should have the benefit of these provisions if either the victim
of the act or the survivor who brings the claim is an American national." Id This
correction prevented several Pan Am families from losing their claims entirely. See
id.
116. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(0 (1997) (defining the limitations period and ex-
plaining that equitable tolling principles, including any time in which the foreign
state was immune from suit, applies in calculating the limitation period).
117. See Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Courts andAdmin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 60
(1994) (statement of David P. Jacobsen) (opposing inclusion of the ten-year statute
of limitations in the antiterrorism exception) [hereinafter Jacobsen Statement].
118. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605(g)(1)(A)-(B) (1997) (setting out the procedures
for limiting discovery in civil cases brought under the antiterrorism exception). If
families are successful in winning a judgment against a foreign sovereign, a com-
panion amendment gives them a better chance of actually recovering awarded
damages. See id § 1610 (a)(7); see also Leigh, supra note 110, at 188 (describing
the antiterrorism exception to the FSIA and its significance to pending and future
civil suits). For the purposes of executing a judgment against state-owned property
under the antiterrorism exception, it is irrelevant whether that property is related to
the act upon which the claim is based. See Leigh, supra note 110, at 188.
119. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(g)(1)(A) (1997).
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until the Attorney General decides that discovery no longer interferes
with any official investigation or operation.' Consequently, the Jus-
tice Department can, almost indefinitely, withhold potentially critical
information from civil litigants.'
These limitations are crucial because they significantly limit the
number of plaintiffs able to bring suit under the new sovereign im-
munity exception. A discussion of the motives and considerations of
the executive branch, in supporting this limiting language, is war-
ranted.
IV. CONCERNS OVER THE ANTITERRORISM
EXCEPTION
A. RECIPROCITY
A concern exists that the United States risks reciprocal treatment
from other states if it expands jurisdiction over them.' Currently,
the FSIA extends United States jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
120. See id § 1605(g)(1)(B) (describing discovery limitations under the
antiterrorism exception). A stay granted, according to this paragraph, is effective
for twelve months from the date of the court order. The court shall renew the order
for additional twelve-month increments, so long as the Attorney General moves
for renewal and certifies that discovery impairs its efforts in the same manner. See
id. A court may not grant or continue a stay if the incident giving rise to the cause
of action is more than ten years old unless the court finds a:
substantial likelihood [discovery] would create a threat of death or bodily injury to any
person; adversely affect the ability of the United States to work in cooperation with
foreign and international law enforcement agencies in investigating violations of
United States law; or obstruct the criminal case related to the incident that gave rise to
the cause of action or undermine the potential for conviction in such case.
Id. §§ 1605(g)(2)(A)-(B).
121. See id. § 1605(g)(1)(A) (identifying when a court must stay a discovery
request from the United States).
122. See Senate Judiciary Committee News Conference, supra note 51 (pg. un-
avail, online) (statement of Bruce Smith) (commenting that the Department of
Justice has not held a criminal trial for the Pan Am bombing and that language in
the FSIA denies the chance of a civil trial by allowing the attorney general to stay
discovery indefinitely).
123. See Schiffer Statement, supra note 110, at 21 (questioning whether legisla-
tion enacted by other countries would be as carefully limited to terrorist acts as the
FSIA); see also, Borek Statement, supra note 110, at 15 (commenting that not only
does the United States look to the FSIA as a guide to asserting immunity abroad,
but foreign states may also apply these same standards against us).
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only in particular cases involving terrorist activities.124 It is impossi-
ble to ensure that similar legislation, enacted by foreign states, would
be as narrowly tailored as the American law is."2 Executive branch
officials also worry that although the United States typically does not
plead sovereign immunity in foreign cases against it, 26 other states
nonetheless may expand the jurisdiction of their courts into areas
considered to be properly immune from their jurisdiction.'
The possibility of civil actions against Libya for the Flight 103
bombing presents an uncertain danger of reciprocation against the
United States. The history of relations between the two countries is
replete with distrust,2s animosity/29 threats, 13° and outight vio-
124. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (discussing the language
of the AEDPA amendment to the FSIA).
125. See Schiffer Statement, supra note 110 (observing that other nations might
respond to the amended FSIA by broadly expanding their own jurisdiction).
126. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, supra note 32, at 9 (stating that the Justice
Department's policy is to avoid pleading sovereign immunity in suits against the
United States in foreign courts). The United States generally waived non-tort ac-
tion immunity in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1994), and tort immu-
nity in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
127. See Schiffer Statement, supra note 110, at 15 (asserting that the United
States risks reciprocal treatment by foreign states by expanding its jurisdiction
with the antiterrorism exception). But see Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts:
Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 38 (1994) (addendum to testimony of Hugo
Princz) (suggesting that the antiterrorism exception would not only provide a solu-
tion for victims of terrorism, but also prevents some foreign states from ever be-
ginning a course of egregious conduct) [hereinafter Princz Testimony].
128. See The President's News Conference, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 22,
26 (Jan. 7, 1986). President Reagan, discussing the role of Libya in training the
terrorists who carried out attacks on international airports in Vienna and Rome,
suggested that Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi was not capable of tell-
ing the truth about his country's participation in the bombings. See id
129. See Interview With Washington-based Independent Network Bureau
Chiefs, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 30, 32 (Jan. 8, 1986). In 1986, America
imposed strict sanctions against Libya. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
Libya responded to these sanctions by asserting that the United States' position
was "tantamount to a declaration of war." See id Qadhafi is considered to focus
his hostilities on the United States because he sees the United States as a barrier to
his ideological and expansionist goals in the Third World. See Libya Under Qad-
haft: A Pattern of Aggression, 25 I.L.M. 182 (1986) (reviewing Libyan terrorist
policies against Middle Eastern and Western countries). Recently, South African
President Nelson Mandela bestowed South Africa's highest award for a foreigner
to Qadhafi, praising him as "my dear brother leader." See Mandela Bestows High
Honor on Gadhafi, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1997, at A30. The Libyan crowds at the
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lence.13 1 Almost twenty years have passed since the United States of-
ficially designated Libya as a state supporter of terrorism.32 Hostili-
ties between the two countries increased in the late 1980s, resulting
in the imposition of strict sanctions on Libya by President Reagan.1
33
This followed the United States declaration that Libya posed an "un-
usual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States" and implementation of a national emer-
gency in response to this danger.
34
The financial and trade embargo against Libya currently prohibits
all trade with Libya and freezes all assets owned or controlled by the
Libyan government in the United States. 13 This lack of any formal
award ceremony lashed out at the United States, holding banners that said
"[d]own, down U.S.A., the enemy of the peoples!" See id.
130. See Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression, supra note 129, at 183.
In January, 1986 Qadhafi, in a press conference, threatened to "pursue U.S. citi-
zens in their country and streets." Id. In April of that year, after the United States
airstrike on Tripoli, a poem read on Libyan state television threatened death to
President Reagan: "You will be killed in a contemptible manner, instantly, like a
pig, with something small, and people will be puzzled and your heart will be like a
sieve." Poem on Libyan Television Threatens Death to Reagan, Hous. CHRON.,
Apr. 30, 1986, at 15. See generally George Church, Hitting the Source, TIME, Apr.
28, 1986, at 17 (providing history and analysis of relations between the United
States and Libya, including an account of threats made by Qadhafi against Reagan
and the United States).
131. See Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern ofAggression, supra note 129, at 183
(mentioning several instances of Libyan-sponsored attacks against United States
interests). In 1979, Libya sponsored an attack on the American Embassy in Tripoli.
See id. In 1981, Libyan jets attacked American jets in the Gulf of Sidra, resulting
in the downing of two Libyan aircraft. See Church, supra note 130.
132. See Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate from
the President of the United States, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 21 (Jan. 7,
1986) (stating that Libya was initially designated a state supporter of international
terrorism in 1979). For a detailed chronology of Libyan support for terrorism
against many countries, including the United States, see Chronology of Libyan
Supportfor Terrorism 1980-85, 25 I.L.M. 186 (1986).
133. See Letter to Congressional Leaders on Libya From President Bill Clinton,
Jan. 10, 1997, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 30 (Jan. 13, 1997) (discussing
American sanctions on Libya and their effect on relations between the two coun-
tries) [hereinafter Letter to Congressional Leaders].
134. Exec. Order 12543, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1986), 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
19 (Jan. 13, 1986). These restrictions included a prohibition of purchases of Lib-
yan imports and exports, and a prohibition on transactions relating to the travel of
Americans to, or in, Libya. See id. The national emergency declared in President
Reagan's executive order has remained in effect and was renewed in January 1997
for another year. See Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 133, at 30.
135. See Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 133, at 30 (discussing
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relationship between the United States and Libya makes it unlikely
that the United States considers itself subject to suit there at all-no
matter how broadly Libyan jurisdiction is defined.
Ultimately, the Libyan response to even the most hostile of
American actions"' amounted to little more than empty threats.'37 It
follows that any anticipated reciprocation by Libya could not gener-
ate enough concern in the executive branch of the United States gov-
ernment to justify preventing Smith from going forward in the district
court.
B. DELICATE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
During Senate hearings prior to the antiterrorism amendments to
the FSIA, the State Department urged that the possibility of civil
suits and potential judgments against foreign supporters of terrorism
could introduce an element of unpredictability into delicately main-
tained international relationships with those terrorist states. 38 Given
the nature of relations between the United States and Libya, however,
it seems facetious to assert that any delicacy between the two coun-
tries exists. The existing United Nations sanctions, spurred on and
supported at the behest of the United States, 139 continue to have a
sanctions currently in effect against Libya).
136. See, e.g., Church, supra note 130, at 17 (providing a detailed account of the
airstrjke). On April 15, 1986 President Reagan ordered an air strike on Libya tar-
geting military and intelligence structures in and around Tripoli including the liv-
ing quarters and command center of Qadhafi. See id Qadhafi's eighteen-month-
old daughter was one of the thirty-seven civilian casualties in the raid. See id at
18. Domestic support for the attack was widespread crossing party and economic
barriers. See id at 23. But see Hatfield Points to 'Folly' of Libya Attack, SEATTLE
TI.MES, Apr. 27, 1986, at B3 (noting that longtime Oregon Republican Senator
Mark 0. Hatfield, in an address from the Senate floor, called the airstrike on Libya
an "immoral act").
137. See supra note 18 (discussing Libya's response to American and Scottish
criminal indictments). Because Libya denies its involvement in the Lockerbie
bombing, the Pan Am 103 bombing cannot be properly considered a Libyan re-
sponse to any United States actions. See id
138. See Borek Statement, supra note 110 (pg. unavail. online) (voicing the
concern that international relations could be affected by the antiterrorism excep-
tion and urging that any changes should be approached with caution).
139. See Fighting Terrorism: Challenges for Peacemakers, Address by Secretary
of State Warren Christopher to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, re-
printed in DEP'T ST. DIsPATCH, June 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Dstate File [hereinafter Christopher Address] (describing America's leadership
role in the fight against terrorism, using U.N. sanctions against Libya as one ex-
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much bigger impact financially on Libya and are, therefore, more
likely to upset relations between the countries than the mere prospect
of a civil judgment.14
0
Historically, there has been extensive coordination with other
countries regarding Libyan terrorism, especially between the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France. 14' This history of intema-
ample).
140. See WAYMAN C. MULLINS, A SOURCEBOOK ON DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 371 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing political responses to
terrorism). Economic sanctions that isolate terrorist-sponsoring third-world nations
can have the greatest impact of all sanctions. See id. These sanctions often compel
a violent response from the sanctioned nation. See id. For example, the late 1970s
Iranian takeover of the United States embassy was in direct response to American-
imposed economic sanctions. See id.
141. See, e.g., Text of Statement Released by the Office of the White House
Press Secretary, Washington, DC, Nov. 27, 1991, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1991,
available in LEXIS, Dstate Library, Intlaw File (explaining that close consultation
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France led to the develop-
ment of joint resolutions reaffirming a condemnation of terrorism and calling on
Libya to comply with U.N. resolutions); Questions of Interpretation and Applica-
tion of The 1971 Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lib-
yan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, 1992
I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14) (Weeramantry, J. dissenting), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 665, 697
(commenting that most of the international conventions concerning terrorism have
been ratified by over one hundred countries).
Terrorist incidents in the late 1980s increased support among Western nations
for United States terrorism policies. See DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 105 (David A. Charters ed., 1991). For example, in
May 1986 major industrial countries at an annual summit in Tokyo issued a com-
muniqud condemning state-sponsored terrorism after Japanese terrorists attempted
to fire homemade bazookas at the building where the leaders were meeting. See id.
Reagan found "firm support for vigorous action against state-sponsored terrorism"
from Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher of Britain and Brian Mulroney of Can-
ada. See id. Britain, Canada, France, Holland, India, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, South
Korea, and West Germany all followed the United States in adopting a "hard-line
approach" to dealing with terrorism. See id. at 108. In 1992, the United Nations
Security Council adopted United Nations Resolution 748, imposing worldwide
sanctions on air travel and prohibiting sales of aircraft or arms technology to
Libya, by a vote of ten in favor to none against, with five countries abstaining. See
U.N. Security Council Resolution 748, supra note 18, at 749. But see
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra, at 106-07 (de-
scribing the diplomatic strategies supported by Western Europe in response to ter-
rorist acts and noting that these strategies reflected distaste for the prospect of
military operations against terrorists); Church, supra note 130, at 26 (explaining
that all but three United States allies withheld their support for the air strike on
Libya and pointing out that France and Spain further refused permission for the
bombers to fly over their territory).
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tional cooperation regarding Libyan terrorism makes it unlikely that
the possibility of a civil judgment in Smith will infiinge upon exist-
ing foreign relations between the United States and its allies.
C. ANTITERRORISM EXCEPTION INCONSISTENT WITH
INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STANDARDS
The State Department further argued that the new provisions of the
FSIA were inconsistent with established international practice and
that this divergence may upset careful balances reflected in American
law on sovereign immunity. 4 2 In past dealings with Libyan terrorist
practices, however, the United States led the development and im-
plementation of policies and sanctions.' Often it required the en-
couragement of the executive branch to persuade United States allies
to participate in policies against Libya.'" At times, the United States
stood alone in refusing to maintain relations with Libya.'45 Therefore,
prior policy does not bar the United States from determining its own
course with respect to Libya, regardless of the support of its allies.
The United States should again take the lead in establishing
142. See Borek Statement, supra note 110 (pg. unavail. online) (withholding the
Department of State's support for the antiterrorism exception based on its incon-
sistency with international sovereign immunity standards).
143. See Christopher Address, supra note 139 (stating that America "spear-
headed efforts" to fight global terrorism, especially in the Middle East).
144. See The President's News Conference of Jan. 7, 1986, supra note 128, at
26 (stating that the United States repeatedly urged the world community to act to-
gether to stop Libyan support for terrorism); see also Statement by the Principal
Deputy Press Secretary to the President, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 30 (Jan. 8,
1986) (announcing that the United States would consult with its allies in Europe
and the Middle East to urge cooperation in imposing economic and political sanc-
tions on Libya). Many European countries had strong economic ties with Libya
and were unwilling to forego these relationships in favor of sanctions. See Inter-
view With Washington-based Independent Network Bureau Chiefs, supra note
129, at 32. At that time, most European countries were slowly recovering from
economic recession and continued to experience excessive unemployment rates.
See id Nevertheless, the sanctions the United States imposed are still in effect to-
day. See Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 133, at 30 (Jan. 10, 1997).
145. See President's News Conference of January 7, 1986, supra note 128, at 31
(recognizing that many Europeans may be economically unable to join the U.S. in
imposing sanctions against Libya and noting that America is "going to go on with
what [it] think[s] has to be done"); see also DEaOCRATIC RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 141, at 105 (stating that the American air-
strike on Libya put the European allies on notice that, in the absence of a collective
response, the United States would act unilaterally).
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antiterrorism policy. That no other country currently bars sovereign
immunity in cases of state-sponsored terrorism is no reason for the
United States to reticently provide this solution for its citizens.'46 The
fact that Congress clearly intended the antiterrorism exception to
provide a remedy to the Pan Am 103 families provides an even
stronger justification for executive branch cooperation in Smith.4 7 In
time, other countries may also find themselves in the same position,
without any truly viable non-violent alternatives other than making
civil judgments available to their citizens.'48
D. DIFFICULTIES DEFINING "INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM"
Finally, opponents of the antiterrorism exception suggested that
"international terrorism" is an imprecise term not suitable as a sub-
ject for important legislation.'49 Antiterrorism exception opponents
assert that these conflicting interpretations do not provide a sufficient
basis for asserting jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. According to
Judge Abraham Sofaer's testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee: "International law provides no support for asserting the
jurisdiction of [United States] courts against a foreign state in cases
involving allegations of an offense so vague and politically charged
as 'international terrorism." 5 0 The difficulty Mr. Sofaer identifies
146. See DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note
141, at 112 (explaining that nations hesitant to cooperate with international efforts
against terrorism will take their lead from the policies of stronger nations).
147. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (stating that the recent
antiterrorism legislation was a specific response to the bombing of Pan Am 103);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, supra note 103, at 41-62 (explaining that the
antiterrorism exception gives American citizens a "financial weapon" against ter-
rorist sponsoring states).
148. See DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note
141, at 109-10 (stating that only joint action by governments will effectively pre-
vent terrorist attacks on civil aviation).
149. See Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 83
(1994) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer) [hereinafter Sofaer statement] (asserting
that the FSIA is too broadly construed given the lack of consensus on terrorism in
the international community). Professor Mullins defines international terrorism as
a type of terrorism consisting of acts conducted by persons or groups being con-
trolled by a sovereign nation. See MULLINS, supra note 140, at 33, 36.
150. Sofaer statement, supra note 149, at 83. Because it is emotionally evoca-
tive, the word "terrorism" sometimes is used as a label for a wide variety of con-
duct including political violence and guerilla warfare. See DAVID E. LONG, THE
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arises in the definition of terrorism itself. "' The United States, how-
ever, should not waver in the fight against state-sponsored terrorist
activities simply because varying definitions of terrorism exist.
"[W]e cannot opt out of every contest. We cannot wait for absolute
certainty and clarity. If we do, the world's future will be determined
by others-most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most
unscrupulous, and the most hostile to everything we believe in." '52
Critics argue that because the antiterrorism exception uses a defi-
nition of terrorism incompatible with definitions used by other coun-
tries, the FSIA's credibility is strained. This neglects to consider,
however, that long-standing beliefs about restrictive immunity un-
derlie the FSIA."' Attitudes about terrorism are often just as
strong.'54 These fundamental views should allow countries to over-
ANATOMY OF TERRORISM 3-4 (1990) But cf Address by Secretary of State George
Schultz Before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference, National Defense Univer-
sity, Jan. 15, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 204, 205 (1986) [hereinafter Schultz
Address] (discussing the possibility of a military response against Libya) Schultz
stated: "We are right to be reluctant to unsheathe our sword. But we cannot let the
ambiguities of the terrorist threat reduce us to total impotence." Id
151. See LONG, supra note 150, at 3 (stating that there are hundreds of defini-
tions for terrorism and there is not likely to be an international consensus on which
definition to use in the near future); STEVEN LIVINGSTON, THE TERRORISM
SPECTACLE 4-7 (1994) (emphasizing the ambiguity of terrorism by describing
some of the numerous definitions); TERRORIsM IN CONTEXT 4 (Martha Crenshaw
ed., 1995) (stating that dispute invariably arises when trying to "specify the unique
qualities of terrorism and to establish the boundaries between terrorism and other
forms of political violence"). Agreements on terrorism in the United Nations
prove impossible because members are so divided over definitions. See STEPHEN
E. ATKINS, TERRORISM 26 (1992). Some member nations argue that certain terror-
ist activities are legitimate and should not be subject to international regulation.
See MULLINS, supra note 140, at 380.
152. Schultz Address, supra note 150.
153. See Dorsey, supra note 20, at 258-59 (stating that the first international
convention on restrictive immunity was signed in 1926 and by 1973 many nations
had adopted the convention). By 1976, almost every Western European country
adopted the restrictive immunity doctrine, and restrictive immunity was generally
recognized as the rule of international law. See id at 259 (discussing the history of
the restrictive immunity doctrine); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, supra note 32,
at 7 (noting that general international law recognizes restrictive immunity).
154. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 150, at 2 (denying that terrorism is a new phe-
nomenon); ATKINS, supra note 151, at 1 (stating that terrorism originated before
Biblical times). The use of political violence is centuries old. See generally,
TOLERATING TERRORISM IN THE VEST (Noemi Gal-Or ed. 199 1) (using case stud-
ies to depict how governmental and societal attitudes towards terrorism have de-
veloped in Belgium, Germany, Israel, Italy, and Spain).
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come any dissatisfaction with the FSIA.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Justice Department should not request a stay of discovery and
instead should provide full support and cooperation to the families of
Pan Am 103 victims.'55 In the context of this case, the primary fears
of the executive branch are less important than they might be in other
cases. There is no danger of straining diplomatic relations with
Libya-the support of our allies is almost certain,'56 and the risk of
reciprocity is small.157 Releasing discovery information will not im-
pede the ongoing efforts of the investigation or the possibility for a
criminal trial. The federal criminal investigation is complete and all
that remains is for Libya to extradite the suspects. The failure to
force the terrorists out of Libya prevents a criminal trial.'58 Instead,
information from the federal investigation should substantially assist
the families in bringing about a civil suit.
Additionally, executive branch cooperation with the Smith plain-
tiffs would further the stated terrorism policy of the United States.
155. See MULLINS, supra note 140, at 363-64 (suggesting that fragmentation
and inconsistency in the government assists terrorists and weakens the ability of
the government to fight terrorism).
156. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para. I of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 748, U.N. Doc. S/23992/Add. 2 (1992) (identifying the 84 United
Nations members supporting Resolution 748 implementing sanctions against
Libya); see also supra note 141 (describing international support for United States
military and economic actions against Libya).
157. See supra notes 125-137 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility
of reciprocation).
158. See Further Report by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of
Security Council Resolution 731, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc S/23672 at 4-5 (1992)
(outlining a meeting between a United Nations official and Qadhafi in which Qad-
hafi stated that there are constitutional constraints that prevent Libya from turning
Libyan citizens over for trial in the absence of an extradition treaty); see also Lib-
yan Letter to U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 18, at 2-3 (describing the good
faith efforts of the Libyan government to cooperate with the international investi-
gation into the Pan Am bombing). The United States refused to agree to Libya's
requests for trial in a neutral country. See id. at 2-4. Some Pan Am 103 family
members agree with this stance. See Rosemary Wolf, Gadhaf's Deal Is No Deal
at All, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1997, at C3. But see Aphrodite Thevos Tsairis, Call
Gadhafi's Bluff: Hold a Trial at the Hague, WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1997, at C3
(expressing the author's "deep disappointment in our government's failed foreign
policy").
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This policy requires the United States: (1) to make no concessions to
terrorists; (2) to pressure states sponsoring terrorism to stop those
activities; and (3) to bring terrorists to justice. ' Supporting a civil
suit against Libya accomplishes all three goals.
First, a civil trial against Libya demonstrates to the world that the
United States is a leader in combating state-sponsored terrorism. It
specifically demonstrates to Libya that the United States will take
every opportunity to bring terrorists to justice."0
Second, the prospect of a civil judgment may deter state-sponsors
of terrorism, previously protected by sovereign immunity, from pro-
viding resources to terrorists.' 6' The possibility of large damage
awards, as well as the negative attention from the international media
could act as a powerful deterrent. For Libya, a civil trial, coupled
with the existing sanctions, makes it clear that the United States will
not tolerate state-sponsored terrorism and will use every economic
penalty to deter these activities. 62 Civil suits are already used with
great success on terrorists within the United States. 63 "Civil action
may become the most effective modus operandi of combating terror-
ism in the future .... Taking the financial resources from the terror-
159. See Current Trends in Global Terrorism, Address to the American Society
for Industrial Security by Director for Regional Counterterrorism Affairs Patrick
N. Theros, June 7, 1994, reprinted in 5 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, June 1994, available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Dstate File (describing the U.S. counterterrorism policy
as designed to meet the high expectations of American citizens for protection of
their persons and interests abroad).
160. See Princz Testimony, supra note 127, at 38 (asserting that the
antiterrorism exception may prevent states from sponsoring terrorism). Cf Beth
Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies
Fit the Crime?, 60 ALBANY L. REV. 579, 605 (1997) (explaining that legislative
history of the Torture Victim Protection Act indicates that Congress views civil
remedies as a means of complying with international law).
161. See Jacobsen Statement, supra note 117, at 60 (stating that military retalia-
tion and economic sanctions do not deter terrorist sponsors as effectively as
monetary penalties).
162. See id at 60-1 (asserting that punishment under the antiterrorism exception
is critical to ending international terrorism); see also United States Counterter-
rorism Policy Hearings before the Intl. Security, Intl. Organizations and Human
Rights Subcomm. of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103d Cong. 82 (1994)
(statement of Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department of State) (declaring
that the United States will not compromise on the issue of justice against Libya for
the Pan Am bombing).
163. See MULLINS, supra note 140, at 393 (discussing the efficacy of civil re-
course on domestic terrorism).
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ists through civil action may prove to be the Achilles' heel of terror-
ism." 164
Third, though a civil judgment will not imprison the terrorists re-
sponsible for the Pan Am bombing, a civil damage award brings
monetary justice. 16' Even where the prospect of collecting a monetary
judgment is unlikely, the families may be satisfied by the judicial
proceedings and finding of liability. 166 Clearly the criminal indict-
ments were ineffective in producing a response from Libya. 67 In al-
most ten years, Libya has shown no signs of true cooperation with
the United States that would enable justice for the family members of
the Pan Am 103 victims. 68 A civil trial gives the families a chance to
bring this episode of their lives to a close, 169 while punishing the ter-
rorists responsible for the bombing and the country responsible for
supporting those terrorists.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the balance between foreign policy considerations and
the principle that American citizens suffering a serious injury at the
hands of a foreign sovereign should have redress in United States
courts weighs in favor of the citizens. Some American citizens are
able to seek redress through the State Department's diplomatic chan-
164. Id.
165. See Stephens, supra note 160, at 605 (discussing the benefits of civil litiga-
tion for victims of international torts, including terrorism); see also MULLINS, su-
pra note 140, at 377 (pointing out that legal remedies are the most successful at
stopping both domestic and international terrorism).
166. See id. (stating that a civil remedy is an important option for victims of
human rights abuses); see also MULLINS, supra note 140, at 377 (asserting that
civil actions provide moral satisfaction to the victims of terrorism as well as to
American society). Civil litigation may be preferable to plaintiffs because they
have a greater degree of control over the timing and direction the case takes. See
Stephens, supra note 160, at 605.
167. See Stephens, supra note 160, at 589-90; see also MULLINS, supra note
140, at 370-71 (asserting that severing diplomatic ties with a terrorist sponsor has
no positive effect and usually serves to increase terrorism directed against the
United States). Trade restrictions and arms embargoes are equally as ineffective.
See id at 371. Economic sanctions are not "particularly effective, even if applied
in the long term." See id. Further, they may serve to encourage terrorism. See id.
168. See supra note 13 (discussing Libya's lack of cooperation with the allies).
169. See Tsairis, supra note 158, at C13 (describing the author's "intense long-
ing for a final resolution to the murders").
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nels. The same foreign policy considerations, however, often get in
the way of enforcing the rights of these citizens.7 Bruce Smith and
Paul Hudson do not have any hope that diplomatic channels will
produce a damage payment compensating them for their respective
losses. In addition, plaintiffs have a very real fear that, if allowed to
proceed with their suit under the amended FSIA in district court, the
Justice Department will seek and be granted a stay on any discovery
requests, effectively ending any chance for a civil judgment.
The United States consistently leads the international fight against
state-sponsored terrorism. Now is not the time to shy away from this
role. The United States must move forward with a new response to
the problem of international terrorism by supporting the Smith plain-
tiffs in their struggle for justice.
170. See Foreign Terrorism and U.S. Courts: Hearings before the Courts and
Admin. Practice Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 3 (1994)
(statement of Hon. Romano L. Mazzoli) (observing that foreign policy considera-
tions often compromise the ability of the State Department to protect and enforce
the rights of American citizens).
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